This blog is based on the case study: “The European Hydrogen Economy: A Carrier for the Green and Just Transition?” that is part of the Horizon Europe research project: GreenPaths.
Introduction
The European Union’s move towards a green transition, especially through the European green deal, is aiming to be a just transition. The Deal’s the introduction of a Just Transition Mechanism clearly indicates that (energy) justice considerations are important in achieving the Commission’s intent of ‘leaving no one behind’. Considerations of energy justice, however, are not always equally at the front of the Commission’s policymaking, such is the case in the EU’s hydrogen framework. This blog highlights some of the key issues in terms of energy justice that have surfaced from in a study bringing an energy justice perspective to the EU’s regulatory approach to the hydrogen economy. More specifically the effects on two specific locations were studied: Groningen in the north of the Netherlands and Morocco (including the contested territories of the Western-Sahara) which are two of the key locations for the implementation of EU hydrogen policy. This blog will argue that the EU should incorporate energy justice principles more effectively in its hydrogen policy: aiming to bring about distributional justice, procedural justice and recognition justice.
The energy justice framework
Energy justice is an emerging framework that has been increasingly adopted both in academia and by civil society (include links for both). While there are some variations across the literature, three dimensions to energy justice are generally operationalised: distributional justice, procedural justice and recognition justice.
Distributive justice asks how the benefits and ills of energy production and consumption are distributed in affected societies. Authors include the (unequal) distribution of both the physical benefits and ills and their associated responsibilities in their analysis.
Procedural justice, the second dimension, asks whether there are equitable decision-making procedures that make sure all groups are able to participate in a non-discriminatory way and that their contributions are taken seriously throughout. Authors include fair and equal access to legal procedures, policymaking and transparency of information from the relevant institutions.
The final dimension, that of recognition justice, asks whether marginalized individuals and groups are fairly represented, free from physical harm and offered complete and equal rights. It is different from procedural justice aspects, instead looking at the respect for and valuation of people and places. Recognition injustice then, in the words of Gordon Walker is: “the process of disrespect, insult and degradation that devalue some people and some places’ identities in comparison to others”.
The EU Hydrogen Policy
Hydrogen has been hailed, particularly by the EU, as one of the key energy carriers for the green transition. The fact that hydrogen does not release CO2 when burned, and its possible utilisation as a fuel in hard-to-abate sectors, has made it popular among EU policymakers. The Commission, sees a great future for hydrogen in meeting the global climate commitments. The EU Hydrogen Strategy seeks to materialize this reality through a three ‘phase’ approach. In the first phase, which ran from 2020 to 2024 and has just ended, the objective was to install at least 6 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers in the EU and produce up to 1 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen. The second phase, from 2025-2030, sees hydrogen become ‘an intrinsic part’ of the energy system with the objective to install 40 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers and the production of 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen. The third phase, from 2030 onwards and towards 2050, would see renewable hydrogen technologies reach maturity and be deployed at large scale to reach all hard-to-decarbonise sectors.
Hydrogen was subsequently identified in the 2022 REPowerEU Plan as one of the six ways to increase the resilience, security, and sustainability of the EU’s energy system. On hydrogen, the Commission set the key indicative target of 10 million tonnes of domestic hydrogen production and 10 million tonnes of imported renewable hydrogen by 2030.
The transition to a renewable hydrogen economy, however, is not without its issues. Despite large public investment, only 1.1 percent of all hydrogen production capacity is currently ‘sustainable’. This ‘sustainably produced’ hydrogen, furthermore, comes with important energy justice challenges inside and outside the EU as we will see.
Energy justice in the EU hydrogen economy: evidence from Groningen, Morocco and the Western-Sahara
Whereas the EU framework on hydrogen places a lot of confidence in the possibilities for green hydrogen in Europe and abroad, such plans have until now come at a cost for energy justice within the regions that have had to implement the plans. Using the three dimensions of energy justice identified above, some of the key injustices arising in Groningen, Morocco and the Western Sahara will be discussed here.
In terms of distributional justice there are multiple justice risks that materialise. For instance, in both Groningen and Morocco hydrogen projects are realised in regions that are energy poor, posing a risk for local energy availability and prices. Meanwhile, the economic benefits of these projects to local communities seem to be slim, with little or no trace of profit-sharing arrangements and employment benefits uncertain. Moreover, while financial risks for these projects were often taken up by the state, the financial benefits of hydrogen projects flow (almost exclusively) to EU-based fossil fuel companies. While similar risks and issues exist, they materialise differently in the two case-studies. In Groningen, distributional concerns rise around the high cost of (green) energy and the financial viability of green hydrogen production that are being paid for by the government. In Morocco, the arid nature of the region means that the amount of water and energy required for hydrogen puts a large strain on the available sources of clean water and green energy, these are aggravated by colonial dynamics of resource extraction. Arguably the most severe distributional injustice is present in the Western Sahara where colonial dynamics of land grabbing and exploitation are prevalent. In short, the EU push for green hydrogen leads to specific justice issues within and outside of Europe.
In terms of procedural justice, public participation is ineffective both within the EU and in Morocco and the Western Sahara. At the EU level, the flagship EU Hydrogen Strategy for instance did have a public participation procedure; however, this was only open for ten business days, which falls short of the reasonable timeframe required by the Aarhus Convention. The consultation received 279 comments, of which only 35 came from citizens. Moreover, throughout the EU, most of the important policy decisions such as the investments in the hydrogen economy and the organisation of infrastructure and storage were made at a European or national without participation by the public. Within Morocco, some sources report that the inclusion of the local community in decision-making related to green energy projects is limited to awareness campaigns. Even when the local community members were invited to public meetings, they received information in a language they did not understand. Sometimes, they were told straightforwardly that they had no choice but to accept the project. While Morocco scores poorly on many of the indicators for transparency and due process, the situation is particularly critical for the Western Sahara, where the protection of indigenous rights seem far from secured and democratic processes insufficiently give voice to these actors.
In terms of recognition justice, again similar risks of underrepresentation and misrecognition were shared between both case studies. In the case of Groningen, this form of injustice manifested particularly through insufficient participation and recognition in decision making on hydrogen projects. For instance, policymakers in Groningen perceived the public in Groningen as deficient in knowledge and understanding about hydrogen. Moreover, past injustices incurred by local communities during the gas drilling in the region were left unaddressed. These risks appear insufficiently considered in the overarching EU regulation and governance structures for green hydrogen projects, while in the concrete projects under examination we find little evidence of acknowledgement and mitigation measures. In the in terms of recognition justice, we found that in particular in the Western Sahara, indigenous and land rights have not been recognized, and there seems to have been little to no recognition of the most vulnerable members of the community. Particularly problematic here is the large scale investments of EU based companies in projects in the occupied Western Sahara, contrary to international and EU law.
Conclusion
The application of an energy justice lens to the EU law and policy on the hydrogen transition shows that there is a blind spot in addressing the justice consequences of such policies. Whereas the EU targets for renewable hydrogen uptake have pushed Member States towards supporting green hydrogen production and demand creation, EU policy has focused too much on the abstract and aggregate economic and CO2-related costs and benefits of this transition. The social (and in particular the justice) dimension of this transition have received little to no attention in EU policy. Significant additional concerns emerge once one integrates (energy) justice concerns along the lines of distributional justice, recognition justice and procedural justice in risk and impact assessments. Both in terms of the domestic effects of the policy proposals and in their international context, little attention is paid to the injustices that accompany the hydrogen transition. If the EU is to move towards a ‘just’ transition, it needs to take action on improving the conditions for energy justice, not only by allowing for a wider sharing of the benefits of the transition, but also by strengthening procedural safeguards and ensuring more inclusive decision-making. This rings true for implementation within the Union, but even more so in third countries where the current EU hydrogen strategy may exacerbate and deepen violations of international law and human rights abuses.
(Photo: Sophia Sideri)
